







This study attempts to synthesize, elaborate, and substantiate the key findings of 
an international workshop, titled “From Parastatals to Private Trade: Why, When, and 
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C. Thang (Vietnam), Jim Roumaset of the University of Hawaii, and Jonathan Kydd and 
Andrew Dorward of the Imperial College, London. Finally, we would like to thank those 
who offered useful comments on an earlier version of the paper, especially David Dawe, 
Derek Byerlee, Jim Roumaset, Shree Sompal, Shawkat Ali, and Endah Murningtys. The 





Using case studies from six Asian countries, this paper (a) assesses the relevance 
of underlying rationales for public intervention in foodgrain markets, (b) documents the 
existing policies and regulations that support operation of grain parastatals, (c) provides 
estimates of benefits and costs of parastatals, and (d) compares experiences of countries 
that liberalized (or reduced intervention) with the ones that continue to have significant 
presence of parastatals. Our results suggest that conditions in the region have improved 
significantly over the past thirty years; and none of the four commonly agreed 
rationales—that is, poorly integrated domestic markets, thin and volatile world market, 
promoting modern technology and the scarcity of foreign exchange reserves—for public 
intervention in foodgrain markets are now persuasive. Domestic foodgrain markets are 
integrated, international markets for both wheat and rice are significantly more robust 
than they were thirty years ago, High-Yielding Varieties (HYV) now cover practically all 
of the high potential area sown to wheat and rice; and foreign currency reserves have 
increased dramatically in all countries in recent years.  
However, although rationales have lost their significance, many countries 
continue to practice old policies and provide regulatory supports to parastatals, including 
monopoly control over international trade, preferential access to transportation, 
restrictions on movement of foodgrains, and cheap or interest-free credit. Relative to the 
private sector, the costs of the grain parastatals have been high and are increasing, as 
special interests and rent- seeking are increasingly dictating their operation. This is being 
manifested in various forms, such as excessive public stocks in India, vacillating import  
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policies in Indonesia and Pakistan, questionable government foodgrain import decisions 
in the Philippines, and politically-determined ceiling and floor prices in India. On the 
other hand, the experiences of Bangladesh and Vietnam, both of which have implemented 
extensive reforms over the last fifteen years, suggest that reduced government 
intervention can promote competition in the domestic markets, reduce subsidies, and 
release funds for development and anti-poverty programs without jeopardizing price 
stability. The paper concludes that reforms are overdue and the delay in changing the old 
ways of doing price stabilization will be increasingly wasteful.  
 
JEL Classifications: 
Key Words: Food marketing parastatals, agricultural price policy, rice and wheat 
markets.   
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1. THE  CONTEXT 
 
The initial economic conditions and the rationales for public intervention in 
foodgrain markets were remarkably similar across the Asian countries where 
governments intervened in their grain markets. Agriculture was largely weather- 
dependent, production variability was high, domestic markets were poorly integrated, 
international markets were highly volatile, and the countries had severe liquidity 
constraints to buy from the international market at the time of scarcity. These countries 
were vulnerable to crop failures, foreign exchange reserves were meager, and national 
food security depended, apart from “mother nature”, on the goodwill and relationship 
with the donor countries. These relationships, however, were not always smooth due to 
sharp differences in political ideology. Therefore, policy thinking in all of these countries 
converged towards attaining self-sufficiency, improving food distribution, and managing 
food security threats arising from weather- related production shocks. This policy 
thinking coincided with the appearance of the Green Revolution, giving the governments 
another justification for intervention—that is, mitigating the risks and uncertainties of the  
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new technology. By early 1970s, a food policy paradigm evolved, with governments 
directly involved in a “procurement-stocking-distribution” chain, which was again very 
similar across the countries.
4   
Nevertheless, the experiences over the years have been mixed. Some countries 
responded by reducing intervention, while the others held on to the old practices with 
minimum reforms. The food subsidy bill has decreased in some countries, but increased 
in others. The government’s shares in foodgrain markets have gone up in some countries, 
but gone down in others.  This objective of this paper is to synthesize these diverse 
experiences and draw implications for further reforms. The next section provides a 
historical overview of the evolution of policies and institutions for public interventions, 
which is followed by a section that analyzes changes in the underlying rationales for 
intervention. Section 4 discusses policy responses to changing rationales; and section 5 
evaluates the performances of price stabilization policies over the past three decades. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the major issues and a discussion of their 
implications.   
2.  FOOD POLICY AND PARASTATALS IN ASIA
5  
 
While underlying conditions were similar, policy design, implementation 
approaches, as well as reforms in later years have varied widely across the countries. 
Policies have been implemented through parastatals in India, Indonesia, and the 
                                                 
4 Note that Vietnam, which started late and from a communist beginning, is a partial exception. 
5 This section draws heavily from the country case studies presented in a workshop in New Delhi in 
December 2003.    
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Philippines; through pure government agency (directorate of food) in Bangladesh; 
through combination of parastatals and state agencies in Pakistan; and through parastatals 
without direct involvement in procurement and distribution in Vietnam. The following 
are brief country-by-country overviews of how parastatals and supporting policies 
evolved over time.  
INDIA 
The great Bengal Famine of 1943 triggered the tradition of public intervention in 
India. The Famine Enquiry Committee Report, as well as other subsequent studies, 
concluded that the root cause of famine was the failure of markets in responding to 
supply shortages in Bengal (i.e., lack of spatial integration), rather than the availability of 
foodgrains in India as a whole, in that particular year.  A Fabian socialistic dogma, which 
viewed traders as parasites in the economic process, pervaded early political leadership. 
Thus, the central premise for heavy public involvement in foodgrains marketing was to 
address the perceived inability of private traders to ensure efficient allocation of essential 
commodities across space and time.  Government actions focused on ensuring a steady 
flow of supplies at “reasonable” prices to consumers through domestic production 
supplemented by imports whenever production suffered a setback.  Until about 1965, 
consumers were generally assured of a minimum supply, but an assured income to the 
producers remained an elusive promise.
6 
                                                 
6 This concern was based, in part, on the assumption that production responds slowly to price, but price 
responds swiftly and inexorably to demand or to fluctuations in supplies.    
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Two major events coincided to prompt a change in policy.  First, in 1965-66 and 
1966-67 the country experienced two unprecedented consecutive severe droughts that 
reduced foodgrains production almost twenty percent below the previous best levels.  
India was in a crisis; only bailed-out by a large volume of U.S. food-aid that severely 
strained the country’s pride.  Second, in 1963 the new high-yielding wheat varieties were 
first grown experimentally in India and by 1966 prospects of the Green Revolution 
appeared promising.  The New Strategy of Agricultural Development, articulated in the 
Fourth Five Year Plan, marked a bold step beyond previous policies.  A deliberate policy 
of combining high-yielding varieties of seeds with a “package” of complementary inputs 
in selected but widely distributed water-assured areas was proposed.  The availability of 
scarce foreign exchange to import fertilizer and other inputs to support the program was 
given priority.  Investments in agricultural supply industries were encouraged.  
Reorganizations of programs in research, extension, and rural credit, which had been 
initiated earlier, were accelerated and given greater support.  However, what marked the 
most significant departure from the old ways was the seriousness and sincerity with 
which the policy recommendations were translated into action, the so called “political 
will”.  
An integrated food and agricultural policy emerged.  Food management 
operations of the government consciously attempted to achieve the objectives of (1) 
increasing production by encouraging adoption of new technology, (2) stabilizing relative 
prices, and (3) protecting the consumption levels of low-income groups.  An Agricultural 
Prices Commission was established in 1965 and so was the Food Corporation of India  
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(FCI) to make the price policy effective. Even through the specific duties of the FCI have 
changed over time, its main objectives have remained the same: (1) providing price 
support to farmers by procuring foodgrains at a “remunerative price”; (2) distributing 
foodgrains throughout the country at “fair” prices; and (3) maintaining buffer stocks to 
ensure national food security.  In achieving these objectives FCI was envisioned to 
operate competitively with private traders.  The guiding premise was that, unlike private 
traders, a public sector agency could act in the social interest.  Given its size and financial 
strength, it was expected to secure for itself a “commanding position in the foodgrains 
trade”. 
INDONESIA  
Traumatic events—the downfall of Sukarno government in the late 1960s– 
triggered an aggressive public approach to food security in Indonesia.  The economy was 
in shambles characterized by negative growth and run-away inflation.  The new 
government was especially sensitive to social unrest generated by high rice prices that 
created political instability for the previous government.  The fear of failure of domestic 
rice markets to arbitrage across time and space, weather induced production changes, and 
volatility in international prices were considered the prime reasons for instability; and the 
food policies were motivated by concerns for both consumption and production in 
Indonesia.  
A key element of the New Order approach under President Soeharto was heavy 
investment in the rural economy to increase rice production and sustained efforts to 
stabilize the price of rice.  Government investment strongly supported the agricultural  
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sector.  Improvements in rural infrastructure – irrigation systems, roads, schools, market 
places, healthcare facilities, communications, electricity, clean water, etc. -- built a 
foundation for a dynamic rural economy.  Packages of technological change in the forms 
of high-yielding rice varieties, fertilizer, pesticides (followed by integrated plant 
protection), and technical advice were developed and disseminated throughout the 
country.  Agriculture had clear first priority in the early development plans.   
Evolving from its role as the logistics agency for the military, the Food Logistics 
Agency (Badan Urusan Logistik = BULOG) implemented a price-band on rice.  A floor 
price kept farm-gate prices of rice above production costs.  BULOG served as a 
stabilizing agent by buying rice production not absorbed by the market, especially during 
the harvest season.  A ceiling price policy maintained affordability of lower-income rice 
consumers, especially in the urban areas; when the price of rice increased sharply during 
planting seasons, drought, and other similar situations, BULOG sold cheap rice to 
targeted consumers.  BULOG was the sole importer of rice; a “big country” justification 
– Indonesia being a large country could have a large influence on prices in what was then 
a thin international rice market – was partly used to support that monopoly role.   
PHILIPPINES  
The Government of Philippines regulated and intervened in rice and corn markets 
as far back as the 1960s.  In the early years, intervention programs were carried out 
through two agencies, namely, the Rice and Corn Board (RICOB) and the Rice and Corn 
Administration (RCA). These agencies were dissolved in 1972 when National Grain 
Agency (NGA), the predecessor of National Food Authority (NFA), was established to  
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promote integrated growth and development of grain industry by addressing the key areas 
of market failures. However, until the early 1980s, price intervention policies, both 
economy-wide and commodity-specific, created an incentive structure that was 
significantly biased against agriculture – primarily evidenced by an over- valued peso to 
protect industry and other economy-wide policies to defend an unsustainable deficit in 
the balance of payments (David 2003).   
In 1981, during a crisis period when rice supply was scarce even in the world 
market, the domestic supply of white corn (a substitute for rice) was short, and the retail 
prices of both rice and corn were high, the government decided that it had to implement a 
price ceiling and rice rationing to defend the ceiling. With an executive order, NGA was 
transformed to NFA with additional mandates that were designed to protect consumers, 
promote rice self-sufficiency and to develop post- harvest technology for grain.   Besides 
providing price support, the NFA was tasked to build and operate a network of storage 
and post harvest facilities throughout the country.  Its’ mandates included 1) stabilizing 
year-round rice prices, 2) making rice affordable for the country’s population, and 3) 
ensuring that palay (un-milled rice) prices gave rice farmers a reasonable level of income.  
Today it is both a regulator and corporation engaged in grains trading.  As such, it has 
four functions: 1) trading, 2) regulatory, 3) developmental, and 4) corporate management.  
The NFA has been the sole importer of rice into the Philippines for over 25 years. 
PAKISTAN  
Pakistan’s tradition of government intervention, in the form of food rationing, was 
inherited at Independence in 1947; and the objective was to mitigate seasonal price  
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swings in the major urban centers that resulted from arbitrage failure due to inadequate 
infrastructure. In the early 1970s, it was recognized that farmers in general and the small 
farmers in particular neither had adequate storage nor sufficient financial capacity to hold 
on to their marketable surplus in the hope of getting better prices later. This was the 
premise for the formation of the Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation 
(PASSCO) in 1973.
7 Funded by the Federal Government and six nationalized banks, the 
agency was established with a wide charter and a range of activities.    
  In practice, PASSCO has concentrated on (1) implementation of a support price 
program for wheat, paddy, gram, potatoes, onions, and oilseeds, (2) price stabilization, 
(3) construction of storage facilities and development of marketing infrastructure, and (4) 
promotion of agro-based processing units, such as rice- husking mills, establishment of 
cold storage, and provision of farm machinery services to farmers.  “Atta” (coarsely 
milled wheat), sugar, and other food commodities were rationed initially.  However, over 
time the system lost its utility, especially in the provision of atta, and suffered from many 
malpractices of officials of the food department and depot holders, fake ration cards, poor 
quality of atta, etc.  Under a new system begun in 1987, the government supplies wheat 
from its stocks at uniform issue-prices to designated flourmills, which are required to 
supply atta through general stores in the market.  In the wake of curtailment of coverage 
of support prices in recent years, PASSCO’s role has been limited to the procurement of 
                                                 
7 PASSCO accounts for only about one-fourth of the wheat procured; Provincial Food Departments (PFDs) 
procure the other three-quarters. However, their mandates are different. PFDs supply wheat to private 
flourmills at a fixed price that does not cover all expenses and, thus, involves substantial consumer 
subsidies.  PASSCO supplies wheat to the designated public sector agencies and recovers all its 
procurement and marketing costs through its sale price.  PASSCO also maintains the country’s strategic 
reserve.    
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wheat regularly and paddy occasionally.  Intervention with other crops has been 
characterized by “adhocism”. 
BANGLADESH  
Like India and Pakistan, the genesis of the food security administrative structure, 
scope, and objectives, including food control mechanisms, was associated with war-time 
emergency followed by the great Bengal Famine of 1943.  The political perception 
inherited from the British colonial tradition of the need to control food grain marketing 
remains firmly embedded even today.  This is illustrated by a plethora of regulatory 
instruments, which, although not enforced or partially enforced, remains in place.  
However, unlike its neighbors, Bangladesh has not employed a parastatal to carry out 
price stabilization; instead, price support and public distributions are operated through the 
Department of Food. 
At Independence in 1971, Bangladesh was one of the poorest regions in the world 
and was hit by a famine in 1974. Therefore, protecting consumers and preventing famines 
were the main policy considerations in the early years. The country was democratic and 
pro-socialist; there was a large influx of food aid and an associated upsurge in public 
distribution. However, the public distribution system was characterized by persistent 
heavy leakage.  Progressive reforms have shifted the orientation of public policy from 
rationing to poverty- alleviation programs. The public system has evolved to achieving 
multiple objectives: targeted distribution to alleviate poverty, disaster management, and 
price stabilization.     
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By the late 1970s, agricultural production started receiving greater attention. 
Deliberate policies were adopted to strengthen agricultural research, expedite technology 
diffusion, and to encourage private sector investment in agriculture. Increased public 
investments in agricultural research and extension in the 1980s and 1990s, together with 
private sector investments in small-scale irrigation, increased production significantly by 
making a shift away from highly flood- susceptible deepwater aman cultivation in the 
monsoon season to boro cultivation in the dry season, which reduced the length of time 
between major crops from 12 to 6 months.  Substantial investment in infrastructure, some 
of which was done through food-for-work, improved the structure of roads, bridges, 
electricity, and telephones.    
And perhaps unique among the countries under review, in 1994 Bangladesh 
liberalized trade policy to permit imports by private traders.  This policy reform, 
subsequently, has become a major component of its stabilization policy.  
VIETNAM  
Vietnam clearly followed a different path than the other five countries.  It initially 
operated under a communist-inspired state control.  However, in the initial phase of 
unification of North and South Vietnam, agriculture was a major disappointment, making 
reform imperative.  Directive 100 in 1981 permitted cooperatives to contract farm 
households to produce given amounts on their own plots but any surplus could be sold on 
the newly liberalized free market (Minot and Goletti 2000). Farmers responded 
impressively to the new incentives: per capita food production grew from 273 kilograms 
in 1981 to 304 kilograms in 1985.   However, in 1985-86, the fiscal deficit ballooned as a  
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result of reduced assistance from the Soviet Union and losses from the state-owned-
enterprises (SOEs).  So in 1986, the government announced its intention to move toward 
a more market-oriented economy.  Resolution 10 of 1988 recognized the farm household 
as the basic unit of production.  Farmers were allowed to buy, own, and sell agricultural 
inputs such as machines, buffaloes, and tools.  Cooperative land was assigned to farming 
households for 10 to 15 years under different forms of contracts or bidding.  Furthermore, 
farmers were allowed to market 40 percent of contracted output.  By 1989, compulsory 
government purchase of farm products was eliminated and private traders were allowed 
to purchase directly from farmers.  Market-oriented reforms were carried out in other 
sectors as well.  The government eliminated most direct subsidies and price controls, 
tightened government spending, set interest rates at positive real terms, unified and 
devalued the exchange rate, and moved toward a more liberalized international trade.  
The government reduced subsidies to SOEs and exposed them to greater competition.  
When Viet Nam began exporting rice, the government restricted the volume of 
rice exports through the use of export licenses, even as international trade in other 
commodities was liberalized.  A SOE (VINAFOOD) retains the leading position (96 
percent of volume) in international trade – which is largely confined to government-to-
government transactions in relatively low-quality food-aid rice with a commercial price 
discount to the prevailing world price to African, Asian, and Middle Eastern markets -- 
although recently, opportunities in international trade have been extended to the private 
sector.  The Government of Vietnam carries out a regulatory role, issuing ordinances and 
decrees, but also signs contracts with other governments and private international buyers,  
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and assigns state-owned enterprises to supply the rice.  The Government is playing an 
increasingly significant role in the development of grades and standards to assist in the 
improvement of quality. 
 
3.  THE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS HAVE CHANGED 
 
If the rationales are evaluated in a “market failure” sense, there are four 
commonly agreed justifications for intervention in foodgrain markets: (i) weak 
infrastructure and limited flow of price information (lack of market integration), (ii) risk 
mitigation for technology diffusion, (iii) thinness and volatility of international market, 
and (iv) inability to participate in the international market.
8  Using cross-country time 
series data, this section analyzes how each of these conditions has changed over time.    
3.1  INFRASTRUCTURE AND INFORMATION FLOW 
When price policies were introduced, transport and communication infrastructure, 
the key determinants of efficient functioning of domestic markets, was either lacking or 
limited in all of these countries. Commodity movement was slow, traders had difficulties 
arbitraging over time and across space, and localized supply shortages were challenges to 
the policy makers in the region. Major food security threats, including famines, have been 
localized phenomena and were not directly linked with food availability in a nation as a 
whole.
9 These unfortunate events resulted from the unavailability or inadequacy of the 
                                                 
8 See Timmer (1989) for a detail discussion on the rationales for public intervention.  
9 This was tragically demonstrated during the Madras Famine of 1876, Bengal Famine of 1943, as well as 
more recent Bangladesh famine of 1974.  
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provision of public goods, such as roads, and because price signals did not get transmitted 
from deficit to surplus regions. Therefore, price stabilization was argued to be a justified 
intervention, as it addresses two sources of market failure: public goods and information 
asymmetry in the market.  
Is this still a valid justification? We have examined data on the key indicators of 
infrastructure and reviewed studies on the food market integration. The data show that all 
indicators of infrastructure and access to information have improved significantly over 
the past three decades (Table 1). Between 1970 and 2000, paved road network has 
increased more than three times in Pakistan and Bangladesh, more than four times in 
India, and an amazing nine times in Indonesia. Growth in paved road network has been 
somewhat slower in the Philippines, where it registered only 27 percent increase between 
the two time periods.  
Indicators of access to information—represented by telephone, radio, and 
television densities—have improved as well. The ratios of telephone ownership to 
population in 1970 were one to 1500 in Bangladesh; one to 841 in Indonesia; one to 566 
in India; one to 469 in Pakistan; and one to 212 in the Philippines. In 2001, every 5
th 
household in the Philippines, every 6
th household in India, Indonesia, and Vietnam; every 
10
th household in Pakistan; and every 55
th households in Bangladesh had access to a 
telephone.
10 The most remarkable of all improvements is the spread of mobile phone 
network to remote areas. While densities are still low, the culture of sharing (or using for  
                                                 
10 All household level calculations are based on the assumption that an average household consists of five 
members.    
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a fee) has revolutionized information flow in most of these countries. In India, the 
number of mobile phones already exceed the number of line phones, and are growing at a 
rate of  2 million a month as on  December, 2004 (GOI, 2004; Mid term review). It is 
now common for foodgrain traders, even for the smaller ones, to carry a mobile phone 
and stay in touch with traders in distant locations. Therefore, price information gets 
transmitted in minutes and traders in various locations are better linked than ever. 
Table 1—Indicators of Infrastructure Status 
 
Period/ 
Indicators  Bangladesh India Indonesia  Pakistan Philippines Vietnam 
All six 
Countries 
             
Paved Roads (Length in 000 km) 
1970 3.7  334.17  21.1  17.49  13.5 --  78.0 
2000  13.9  1,363.00  203.21  65.2 17.1 96.1 293.1 
             
Ground line Telephones ( per 1000 people) 
1960s  --  1.450 1.100  1.850 3.600  --  2.000 
1970s  0.967  2.700 1.850  3.117 7.717  --  3.270 
1980s  1.578  4.370 3.970  5.240 9.500 1.189 4.308 
1990s 2.684  16.124  18.970  16.632 23.782 13.835 15.338 
2001 4.303  37.523  34.512  23.322 42.381 37.598 29.940 
             
Cellular Phones ( per 1000 people) 
1980s     0.045  0.018    0.032 
1990s  0.468 1.332 4.306  0.854  19.142  2.277 4.730 
2001 3.961  6.262  31.175  5.601  149.576  15.424  35.333 
            
 Televisions (per 1,000 people) 
1970  0.12 0.05 0.75  1.51  10.67  23.42  6.09
1980s  2.80  7.32  33.69  14.81 30.06 34.69  20.56
1990s  6.35  57.25 109.00  63.25  98.13 117.47  75.24
2000  6.98  78.03  149.46  130.97 143.79 184.76  115.67
           
  Radios (per 1,000 people) 
1970  12.79 31.05  8.51 49.50 41.04 65.53  34.74
1980s  31.75 61.52  134.21  84.29 75.77  101.03  81.43
1990s  46.52  103.96 151.77  101.13 147.43 106.11  109.49
2000  49.44  120.53 157.19  105.09 161.23 108.67  117.03
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from WDI (2003) CD-ROM. A “s” after the year reflects  







The ownership of television and radio has also improved dramatically during the 
past three decades. In 1970, one in 20,000 people (or about one in 4000 households) in 
India, one in 8000 people in Bangladesh; one in 1333 people in Indonesia; and one in 663 
people in Pakistan had a television set. In the Philippines and Vietnam, the numbers were 
one in 93 and one in 43, respectively. By the year 2000, again assuming a household size 
of five, almost every household in Vietnam; every other household in Indonesia, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines; every third household in India and every twenty-ninth 
household in Bangladesh had a TV set. The radio ownership has also increased by similar 
magnitudes in the 1990s. 
  The improvements in infrastructure and information flow are reflected in recent 
studies of market integration (Table 2). All of the studies on Indonesia find regional 
markets to be integrated. Three different studies on the Philippines, using three different 
methodologies, conclude that provincial markets for rice are well- integrated, although 
Mendoza and Rosegrant (1995) found corn markets to be poorly integrated. Similarly, 
analyzing prices in 27 provinces for various time periods, studies have concluded that the 
Indonesian rice markets are rapidly adjusting and well- integrated. In Bangladesh, 
performance of rice markets has changed from being severely disintegrated in the 1970s 






Table 2—Recent Market Integration Studies in Selected Countries 
Country / Study  Geographic Coverage  Time 
Period 
Findings 
INDIA      
    Gosh, M. (2003)  Wheat markets in Bihar, 
Haryana, Punjab, Rajsthan, 
Uttar Pradesh  
 
1984-97 
Wheat markets within and across 
states are spatially integrated;  
    Kumar and Sharma (2003)  Rice in regional markets in 
Haryana 
  Integrated in the long, but not in 
the long run 
    Jha et al.(1998)  All India, state to state price 
transmission analyses 
1984-97  Wheat markets are integrated 
across states 
    Palaskas and Hariss-White  (1993)  Rice in three regional 
markets in West Bengal  
1988-90  Integrated in the long run, but 
not in the short run 
    Puri (1997)  All India level analyses of 
rice and wheat 
1985-95 Most  markets  integrated in the 
long run, but not the short run 
    Baulch and Jariath (1997)  Wheat in seven regional 
markets in Rajasthan 
1992-96  Not integrated in the short run 
INDONESIA      
   Ismat,  et al. (1998)  Rice in nine major 
provinces 
1982-93  Rice markets in all major 
provinces are integrated 
   Alexander and Wyeth (1994)  Rice in all 27 provinces  1979-90  Except two provinces, all 
markets are well integrated 
   Alexander and Wyeth (1995)  Rice in all 27 provinces  1979-90   
   Ellis, M. and B. Trotter (1991)  Rice in all 27 Provinces    Competitive and rapidly 
adjusting 
PHILIPPINES      
   Silvapulle and Jayasuriya (1994)  Rice in five market 
locations 
1975-89  Regional markets are well 
integrated 
  Mendonza and Rosegrant (1995)  Corn markets     
  Baulch, B. (1997)  Rice in regional markets  1980-93  All regional markets are 
integrated 
BANGLADESH      
   Dawson and Dey (2002)  Rice in 12 regional markets  1992-97  Perfectly integrated  
   Das et al. (1997)      Integrated in both short and long 
run 
   Goletti et al.(1995)  Rice in 64 districts   1989/90-
1991/92 
Degree of market integration 
moderate 
   Ravallion, M. (1987)  Six districts in Bangladesh  1972-75  Lacks integration both in the 
short and in the long run 
PAKISTAN      




Wheat and rice markets are well 
integrated spatially right after 
harvest, but wheat markets are 
not integrated inter-temporally. 
VIETNAM      














The results of market integration studies on India are mixed; and the only study 
on Vietnam concludes that rice markets, at least over distances, are not well-integrated. 
However, in both cases lack of integration is largely attributed to government regulations, 
particularly the restrictions on movement of foodgrain. In India, transportation by road 
requires passage through a large number of checkpoints that increase costs and reduce 
private traders’ profitability due to inordinate delays and payment of “speed money” 
(World Bank 1999).
11 This is consistent with the common finding that Indian foodgrain 
markets are integrated in long run, but not in the short run. Similarly, in Vietnam, 
movement restrictions prevented spatial arbitrage from bringing price differences down 
to the costs of transportation and marketing; and as of late 1996, the procedures to buy 
and transport rice from the south to the north resembled those of trade with another 
country (Minot and Goletti 2000).   
3.2   RISK MITIGATION AND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION  
In the 1960s, when these countries embarked on promoting Green Revolution 
technologies, domestic markets were poorly integrated, insurance and credit markets 
were either missing or incomplete, and the farmers operated in a highly uncertain 
production and marketing environment. All these factors greatly enhanced the risks and 
discouraged farmers from adopting the new technology. Therefore, one of the central 
                                                 
11 In addition to imposing several restrictions on private trade, Government of India has offered concessions 
to FCI such as cheap credit and priority in public transportation, which have made FCI a privileged trader 
in Indian foodgrain markets.  Furthermore, pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing policy leads to a 
situation where there are no geographical and inter-temporal price variations in trade that both reduces 






rationales for price support policy was to mitigate those risks and help farmers ensure 
profitability of cultivating their land with modern crop varieties.
12  
Cross-country data show that promoting technology adoption is no longer a 
persuasive justification for public intervention in foodgrain markets. The High-Yielding 
Varieties (HYV’s) now cover practically all area sown to wheat and a large proportion of 
area sown to rice (Table 3). Note that Table 3 is constructed to show the percentage of 
total HYV rice area to total rice area, and does not reflect the true saturation of 
technology adoption. There are essential requirements, such as irrigation facilities and 
low probability of flooding, which constrain cultivation of HYV rice but not the 
traditional varieties.
13 A better indicator would be to take HYV area as percentage of 
irrigated rice area, but such disaggregated data are not available for all countries. Data 
from India and Bangladesh suggest that, if irrigation is available, farmers allocate almost 
hundred percent of their land to modern variety rice. In summation, these numbers 
suggest that most farmers have mastered the technology and that their land allocation 
decision (to cultivate HYV or other crops) is dictated by the profitability of crops, not by 
the unfamiliarity (or familiarity) of the technology.  Therefore, promotion of technology 
adoption is no longer a persuasive argument for intervention, except in a few areas that 
have lagged behind due to physical or geographic constraints.   
                                                 
12 In fact, floor price guarantee is a variant of forward-pricing schemes, which promotes farmers’ 
willingness to participate and reduces enforcement problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection, 
inherent in instituting futures markets in developing countries. See, Stiglitz (1987) and Islam and Thomas 
(1996) for a review of these issues.  
13 For example, in flood prone areas of Bangladesh, farmers cultivate deep water aman (a long stem 
traditional variety) that is more resilient to flooding.  Therefore, it is perfectly rational for the farmers to 
cultivate traditional varieties in such circumstances and they will continue to do so irrespective of price 






Table 3—Percentage of Area Sown to Modern Rice and Wheat Varieties 
 
Period Bangladesh  India  Indonesia Pakistan  Philippines Vietnam 
All six 
countries 
   (          in percent          ) 




  -- 31.0
   12.3 
1970s 14.3  33.1 40.9  --  65.6  4.7
  31.7 
1980s 31.4  56.6 72.2  --  85.8  31.1  55.4 
1990s 49.4  61.9 70.8  --  81.7  64.2  65.6 
Latest 61.8  71.9 76.7  --  96.3  85.6  78.5 
            
WHEAT            
1970s 7.7  29.5  --  43.0  --  --  26.7 
1980s 94.8  67.8  --  80.7  --  --  81.1 
1990s 95.7  76.0  --  86.1  --  --  85.9 
Latest 100.0  92.0  --  94.0  --  --  95.3 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from IRRI (2004); FAOSTAT (2004); and CIMMYT (2004).   
               The numbers reflect averages for the decade for rice  
 
3.3  THINNESS AND VOLATILITY OF GLOBAL FOOD MARKETS 
In the 1960s, attaining self-sufficiency in food was one of the central drivers of 
food and agricultural policies in Asia. The common argument for this policy standing was 
that the world market was highly volatile and too thin for these countries to bet on their 
food security.  The rice market was particularly volatile.  Factors contributing to 
instability were the geographic concentration of rice production, a thin and fragmented 
world market with high transactions costs in trading, low domestic price elasticity of 
demand, and relatively low world stockholdings.
14   The situation, however, has changed 
over the past two decades on all counts.  
                                                 
14 Thomas Jayne, “Sources of Instability in the World Rice Market”, MSU International Development 
paper No. 13, Department of Agricultural Economics and Department of Economics, Michigan State 






First, global foodgrains markets have matured in terms of traded volume, as 
percentage of total global production and consumption (Table 4). Wheat and maize 
markets have always been relatively robust.  In 1966, India imported over 10 million tons 
of wheat, albeit provided as food-aid under PL 480, without large disruptions in the 
international wheat market.  On the other hand, during the 1960s or 70s, Indonesia’s 3 
million tons of imports in a 7-10 million ton international rice market could have had 
significant impact on international rice prices.  But the international rice market is now 
approximately 25 million tons annually, production has become more stable due to 
irrigation and pest control, and new exporters, particularly Vietnam, have become large 
participants.  Bangladesh successfully utilized privatized international trade, albeit with 
certain favorable circumstances, as a major source of its price stabilization and food 
security program to adjust to a poor harvest in late 1997 and a massive flood in 1998 
(Dorosh 2001).  In 1998 Indonesia was able to import over 6 million tons of rice in the 
wake of the worst drought in recent history with very little impact on the world rice 
market (Timmer 2002).   
Second, although it is still high compared to domestic markets, price volatility in 
international market has shown significant decline in the past two decades, particularly in 
the 1990s. In a recent study, Dawe (2004) has demonstrated that the average absolute 
value of annual rice price change has declined from 24 percent during 1965-1981 to just 
11 percent during 1985 and 1998.  The author attributes the increased stability to three 






commercial orientation of several major exporters.  These patterns suggest that rice prices 
are likely to remain relatively stable in the future. 
Table 4—Changes in the Trade of Cereals in the World Market 
Indicators / Year  Rice   Wheat  Coarse grain 
World Trade as Percentage of Production     
1972-1974  3.54 18.65  10.40 
1975-1977  3.93 17.81  12.24 
1978-1980  4.70 19.51  13.65 
1981-1983  4.04 21.70  12.71 
1984-1986  3.87 18.43  10.80 
1987-1989  3.72 21.28  12.72 
1990-1992  3.90 19.25  11.07 
1993-1995  5.20 18.68  10.97 
1996-1998  6.12 17.42  10.30 
1999-2001  6.26 18.63  11.81 
2002/2003  7.27 19.40  12.02 
 
World Trade Volume (in Million tons)     
1972-1974  7.79 65.64  65.14 
1975-1977  9.53 67.57  82.70 
1978-1980  12.35 84.05  100.16 
1981-1983  11.71 101.34  93.43 
1984-1986  12.25 93.85  88.62 
1987-1989  12.29 107.91  97.52 
1990-1992  13.82 108.42  92.53 
1993-1995  18.93 100.87  90.51 
1996-1998  23.73 103.37  92.14 
1999-2001  25.08 108.65  103.44 
2002/2003  27.50 110.00  104.80 
 







3.4   ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET.   
Another justification, which was quite significant in the early years, was that most of 
these countries had little foreign currency reserve and their food security greatly depended on 
food- aid flow. The severity of the problem is demonstrated by plotting the value of cereal 
imports (commercial plus food- aid) as percentage of foreign currency reserves (Figure 1).
15  
Notice that, until about early seventies, cereal import values exceeded foreign currency 
reserve in India and Indonesia, and constituted a high proportion of total reserve in Pakistan 
and the Philippines. In Bangladesh, cereal import value was higher than foreign currency 
reserves as late as in 1987. These numbers clearly demonstrate the critical link among foreign 
currency reserves, food- aid, and food security. Clearly, without food- aid, the countries 
would have encountered serious food security problems until about late seventies.   
The link between foreign currency reserve, food security, and food- aid was clearly 
manifested in India when it was hit by two consecutive droughts in the mid-sixties. In 1966, 
the country needed more than ten million tons of food to feed its populations and had about 
US$ 419 million in reserve. This means that spending entire reserve could buy only 6.76 
million tons of wheat at current prices (US$62 per ton). Therefore, when the U.S. called off 
food assistance under PL 480, the situation turned into a crisis. The leaders of India had to 
appeal to the US to re-consider food- aid assistance; and the US eventually came forward to 
bail out the country by supplying more than eight million tons of food- aid. This experience 
                                                 
15 Foreign currency reserve does not include gold value, SDR’s and fund with the IMF.  Cereal import includes 






severely strained national pride and attaining food self-sufficiency quickly became top 
priority of the government’s policy agenda articulated in the Fourth Five Year Plan.  
A review of the trends in foreign currency reserves and import capacity, defined as the 
export value of goods and services deflated by import price index, indicates that the situation 
has improved dramatically over the past three decades (Table 5).  To better understand the 
magnitudes of improvement; let us consider Indian case in 2004.  During June-July 2004, 
total foreign currency reserve in India was US$120 billion and rice was selling in the world 
market at $185 per ton. This implies that, ceteris paribus, buying all 25 million tons of rice 
available in the world market would take less than five percent of Indian foreign currency 
reserves. This is quite a contrast to the situations of drought years in the mid-sixties! The 
improvements in other countries are also remarkable. Except Bangladesh, which continues to 
receive large food- aid, and in Pakistan where import values were high for a couple of years in 
the 1990s, value of total cereal imports in most of these countries now constitutes only a small 
fraction of their total foreign currency reserves. This implies that international liquidity is no 
longer a major constraint and hence can use the world markets to meet their food security 
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Table 5—Indicators of Ability to Use International Markets to Ensure Food Security (10 
year annual average) 
 
Period Bangladesh  India  Indonesia Pakistan Philippines Vietnam 
All six 
countries 
             
Foreign Exchange Reserves (million US$)
  
1960s   422  59  188  100  --  192 
1970s 241  2,938  1,859  322  1,429  --  1,358 
1980s 463  4,171  4,735  747  1,059  --  2,235 
1990s 1,892  19,598  16,628  1,297  7,630  2,292  8,223 
2001-2003 1,843  69,954  30,848  7,468  13,213 4,668  21,332 
             
Share of Cereal Import Value to Foreign Exchange Reserves (in percent) 
1960s --  151.26  285.21  37.81  56.02  --  132.58 
1970s 142.72  49.91  37.56  42.08  10.17  --  56.49 
1980s  72.64 6.32  8.21 29.22  28.54  -- 28.99 
1990s 20.21  0.96  7.31  33.97  7.59 0.05  11.68 
2001 21.47  0.00  2.64  0.98  4.49  0.03  4.94 
              
Import Capacity  (Index: 1995=100) 
1970 24.33  19.31  6.55  52.39  23.36    25.2 
1975-80 13.81  29.18  37.93  38.39 30.34    29.9 
1980s 26.69  46.43  51.80  48.61  49.10  27.46  41.7 
1990s 97.04  107.04  101.52  97.41  105.84  87.76  99.4 
2001 168.22  179.29  119.41  104.76  144.90    143.3 
Sources: World Development Indicators (2003) CD-ROM; IMF-IFS (2004).  






4.  BUT THE OLD WAYS CONTINUE IN MOST COUNTRIES 
 
The previous section has demonstrated that the key rationales for public intervention 
have lost significance over the past thirty years. Policies have changed too, but changes have 
varied across countries. This section attempts to evaluate these mixed experiences. We focus 
on two aspects of policies:  (i) policies designed to facilitate parastatals’ operations and (ii) 
the changes in the size and scale of their operations. 
4.1  POLICIES TO FACILITATE PUBLIC INTERVENTION PROGRAMS 
Historically, a range of government regulations has supported parastatals or other 
government agencies involved in the food intervention programs. Monopoly controls in 
international trade, restrictions on movements of foodgrain by the private sector, concessional 
credit and preferential access to transportation for the parastatals, and limits on private storage 
have been extensively used in all of the countries. A summary is presented in Table 6 and 
economic arguments and current practices for each of the regulations are discussed below.  
4.1.1  Monopoly in International Trade 
There are two arguments that have been commonly cited to justify governments’ 
monopoly control over international trade of foodgrain: (i) to keep a control over scarce 
foreign currency reserves, and (ii) to take advantage of scale economies. The first argument is 
that, since the foreign exchange reserve was limited, and food import accounted for major 
share of its use, there had to be a mechanism to monitor and regulate its usages. Therefore, it 
was assumed that by taking administrative decision for import, instead of business decision, 






currency reserves. The second argument goes like this. Since governments were large buyers, 
and there were many sellers in the international markets, they would have higher bargaining 
power (some degree of monopsonistic power) to negotiate lower import prices. By contrast, if 
private traders were allowed to import, they would have no bargaining power (price takers) 
and hence would have to pay higher prices. This would, the assumption goes, not only 
increase domestic prices, but would also drain out precious foreign currency reserves.   
Since the foreign exchange reserves have improved dramatically, the first argument is 
no longer persuasive. Regarding the second argument, the reality has been quite contrary to 
the central assumptions. The empirical evidence suggests that, instead of enjoying scale 
economy, the policy has actually served as an easy avenue of rent-seeking by the bureaucrats 
and politicians who were entrusted to make import decisions. For example, analysis of 
historical data of wheat import in India suggests that, in most of the years, government has 
actually paid higher import prices.
16 Another empirical example comes from Bangladesh, 
where both government and the private sectors imported foodgrain to address crisis following 
the 1998 flood. Although the size of government import was much larger than private sector 
(the size of each consignment of public import was about 82,000 tons compared to 300-400 
tons by the private sector), government paid substantially higher prices and took much longer 
time to complete the transactions.
17 Our country case studies suggest that similar evidence is 
available from other countries as well, particularly in the Philippine and Indonesia both of 
which have practiced monopoly control for many years.  
                                                 
16 In India, there are reports that some bureaucrats have been implicated for “rent seeking” in grain imports.   
17 These numbers are based on Annex 4 of Ali and Jahan (2003), who provide transaction details obtained from 






Nevertheless, despite mounting evidence, many countries continue to exercise trade 
control, partially or fully, over foodgrain markets in Asia. The parastatals (or government 
agencies) control imports of rice and corn in the Philippines, export of rice in Vietnam, and 
import of wheat in Pakistan and India. The last two decades have also witnessed vacillating 
import policies in both Indonesia and Pakistan. In 1987-88, Pakistan freed wheat import but 
quickly reversed its policy on the ground that private sector was importing sub-standard 
wheat. Since then, government has regularly imported wheat, involving large subsidies, to 
feed its public distribution schemes that have mainly benefited the flourmills and have been 
reported in local media to have bred corruption in the Food Departments. Total subsidy on 
government export and import was as high as US$ 190 million in 1995/96, equivalent to 
about 68 percent of total food subsidy bills. Similarly, in Indonesia, rice import restriction was 
lifted in 1998, but resulted in larger volume of import and with this, increased calls (including 
from BULOG) for increased protection. The government instituted a temporary ban on 
imports and allowed only a group of especially- licensed importers to import rice (USDA-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.1.2 Movement  Restrictions 
In the Indian sub-continent, the policy of movement restriction dates back to 
colonial rule in early 1940s, when it was enforced with dual objectives of preventing 
hoarding and building stocks for distribution in major urban centers. The objectives, 
however, changed when price support policies were adopted in the 1960s. The idea now 
was to bring the prices down to the support price level in surplus areas so that 
governments could procure sufficient supply for their buffer stocking and public 
distribution operations. In India, researchers often used a term, known as “bottle up”, 
which became very popular in the 1970s and 1980s when government frequently 
enforced movement restrictions in the surplus states.  
The policy of restricting foodgrain movements by private sector is still partially 
enforced in India and Indonesia; and frequently enforced in Pakistan and Vietnam. 
Pakistan officially lifted movement restrictions in 2001, but in 2004 restriction on wheat 
movement was being enforced in the state of Punjab to facilitate public procurement of 
wheat. Similarly, movement restriction in India was officially withdrawn in 1977, but 
kept re-appearing until the 1990s. Even today, India enforces movement restrictions in 
selected states on the ground of preventing smuggling to neighboring countries. In 
Vietnam, as of late 1996, rice trade between north and south resembled that of trade 
between two separate countries (Minot and Goletti 2000). Why is this policy so popular 
and keeps re-appearing? Presumably, it does aid public procurement.  However, it also 
creates lucrative rents for an influential group of stakeholders, involving food officials, 






conducive to resource allocation and market development. The Indian experience clearly 
suggests that the policy has hindered private trade, bred corruption, and contributed to 
poor integration of markets.
18  
4.1.3  Concessional Credit Facilities  
Governments have to commit financial resources for implementing floor and 
ceiling price policies. Food logistic agencies need a line of credit to purchase grain, 
domestically or internationally, and to store it until prices go high enough to justify 
market injection. There are three important economic consequences of this policy. First, 
parastatals require large volumes of credit (often 20 to 30 percent of total agricultural 
credit) and hence can reduce credit availability to other sectors. This was indeed the case 
in India during he early to mid-nineties when credit extended to FCI accounted for 75 to 
94 percent of total trade credit (RBI 2001).  Second, it discourages private traders whose 
transaction costs become higher relative to parastatals’. Finally, Timmer (1989) argues 
that when prices become stable, credit demand becomes unstable; and the instability can 
impose significant adjustment costs to the rest of the economy whether the food logistic 
agency is increasing or decreasing its use of credit.
19   
Our country case studies indicate that all countries have provided, at one point or 
the other, concessional credit to their food marketing agencies and many countries 
                                                 
18 The policy was counter-productive even in the early years in India. After the central government gave 
power to the provinces to control movement, every province, every district, every taluk (smallest 
administrative unit) in eastern India had become a food republic unto itself, destroying the trade machinery 
for the distribution of foodgrain (Chopra 1981). 
19 To further elaborate this point, he writes, “when credit demand rise (say after a good harvest), interest 
rates rise or government loans are rationed, budgets of other agencies are cut, investment project delayed, 
or the deficit is financed by increasing the money supply, with attendant potential for inflation. On the other 
hand, when loan is unexpectedly repaid, money and purchasing power is withdrawn from the economy, 






continue the policy (Table 6). The FCI has enjoyed preferential credit access since 
1973/74. The interest rate on FCI credit was about seven percentage points lower than 
market rate until 1982/83 and 5-6 percentage points thereafter. Indonesia had similar 
policy until 1998. BULOG had access to an unlimited line of credit at heavily subsidized 
interest rates in the early years and at commercial rates, but guaranteed by the Bank of 
Indonesia, since 1998 (Timmer 2002). In 1998, the VINAFOOD received interest- free 
loan, roughly about US$150 million, from its government’s export promotion fund to 
purchase and export rice.    
4.1.4 Other  Restrictions 
Parastatals (or government agencies) have also been supported by other 
restrictions / public facilities in the Indian subcontinent. Two of the common practices 
have been restrictions on storage and preferential access to transportation, both of which 
continue to be enforced in India. Restrictions on private storage originated from a 
common perception that traders are speculators who make abnormal profits by 
“hoarding” and artificially increasing prices. A direct policy outcome of such perception 
was the promulgation of the “Essential Commodities Act” in India and “Anti-hoarding 
Act” in Bangladesh, which, although not strictly enforced, is still in existence. In 
addition, public food agencies in both countries had enjoyed preferential access to 
railway transportation for years. While Bangladesh reformed this policy in the late 1990s, 
the FCI in India continue to enjoy it. In fact, the private traders get only sixth preference 
if they want to transport their grain through Indian railways (Deininger and Deininger 






4.2   CHANGES IN THE SIZE AND SCALE OF OPERATION OF FOOD 
MARKETING AGENCIES 
 
This subsection attempts to describe how the scale of operation and size of 
parastatals have changed since their formation.  Evidence is mixed. Compared to the 
early years of the Green Revolution, parastatals’ (government’s) market shares, measured 
by the percentage of  procurement to total production, have increased significantly in 
India, modestly in Bangladesh, and declined in  the Philippines and Pakistan (Table 7).
   
The most striking example is India, where public procurement of rice and wheat has 
increased from about ten percent of production in the seventies to more than 25 percent 
and 22 percent, respectively, in recent years.  
While public procurement has declined in Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Pakistan, total public distributions have actually increased, as governments in these 
countries imported larger volumes of foodgrain to feed their public distribution programs. 
For example in the Philippines, although rice equivalent paddy procurement by the NFA 
was less than three percent of market of production in the 1990s, public distribution 
accounted for more than ten percent of total food supply.
20 This is very different from the 
1970s when procurement (6.13 percent) was larger than distribution (4.69 percent). The 
same is also true for Indonesia, where procurement as percentage of production (4.51 
percent) was more than double the BULOG’s distribution as percentage of total supply of 
rice (11.83 percent). In Pakistan, not only has total distribution increased, public 
procurement as percentage of total production (by provincial food agencies and 
                                                 
20 The total supply of food, taken from FAOSTAT, includes food for human consumption only; and is 






PASSCO) continue to be large, ranging between 23 to 35 percent of total wheat supply 
over the past three decades (Table 7).  
 




1  India Indonesia
2  Pakistan Philippines
3 
          
     (in  percent)     
Procurement as percentage of total production (milled rice) 
  Rice          
1970s 1.52  9.82  3.54  --  6.13 
1980s 1.82  14.01  6.80  --  5.28 
1990s 3.31  16.88  4.51  --  2.53 
2001-2003 3.11  25.26  --  --  2.68 
        
  Wheat          
1970s 2.60  18.33  --  --  5.18 
1980s 9.06  19.53  --  29.69  1.16 
1990s 4.68  20.88  --  24.39  0.25 
2001-2003 5.28  22.32 --  20.50  -- 
        
Distribution as percentage of total supply 
  Rice          
1970s 4.33  9.46  10.82  --  4.69 
1980s 3.83  14.65  9.11  --  8.35 
1990s 3.31  13.42  6.67  --  10.50 
2001-2002 3.47  15.45  11.83  --  12.71 
  
Wheat    
1970s 81.24  26.41  95.66  --  1.67 
1980s 66.14  19.73  102.37  27.04  0.89 
1990s 39.65  17.62  97.30  35.31  3.82 
2001-2002 19.85  19.56  92.60  22.66 7.94 
 
Sources: Ahmed, Haggblade, and Chowdhury (2000) and Food Planning and Monitoring unit for Bangladesh;  
              NFA website for the Philippines; Rashid and Gulati (2003) for India; Timmer (1996: Appendix) and  
              Arefin (2003) for Indonesia; FAOSTAT (2004) CD-ROM for supply and production statistics. 
Notes:  
1The distribution figures in Bangladesh include food aid, which is the main source of supporting  
                social safety net programs.  
                       2Since domestic production is miniscule, the distribution of wheat in Indonesia is calculated as      
                total wheat import as percentage of total supply.   
                        3The Philippines figures under wheat are for white maize.  
                        4 Total supply of food, taken from FAOSTAT, includes only the food available for human  






Another way to assess changes in the size of public price stabilization efforts is to 
examine total number of employees, but unfortunately such time series data are not 
available for all countries. However, the data that we have available suggest that total 
number of employees in food logistic agencies has increased in India and decreased in 
Bangladesh. In India, FCI started its operation with only 3904 employees in 1965, which 
increased to about 29,000 by 1970, more than 50,000 by 1980, and about 65,000 in the 
1990s.
21  In addition, Indian food policy has also created a large group of stakeholders 
that include about half a million ration shops, 219 million ration cards, and more than 
6000 state marketing and regulatory agencies (including “mandi boards”) directly 
involved with public food management programs (Rashid and Gulati 2003).  
In Indonesia, BULOG’s total staff strength reached about by the 1990s.  The  size 
has important implications for BULOG, especially after it has been transformed into a 
state-owned-enterprise (STE) in 1998 to operate on commercial principles. Furthermore, 
given it past record of inefficiencies which was estimated to be US$ 2 billion during 
1993-98, downsizing and re-structuring is perhaps unavoidable for BULOG to be a 
sustainable STE in the near future. 
By contrast, the size of the government agency responsible for price stabilization 
has declined by 30 percent in Bangladesh.  On the average, the Directorate of Food 
employed 11,598 employees in the eighties, which gradually has declined after reforms to 
8170 during 2001-02. With the downsizing, the efficiency of the food department has 
improved too. For example, the system loss (storage and transit losses) has declined from 
                                                 
21 The numbers for 1965-1980s are from Chopra (1981); World Bank (1999) reported 65,000 regular 
employees and 175,000 casual workers. However, according to FCI’s statistics on its website, it now has 






being as high as three percent of distribution in the eighties to about one and a half 
percent in the 1990s (Ahmed et al. 2003) and the public distribution system, in 
combination with private import, contributed effectively in managing 1998 flood (del 
Ninno, et al. 2001).  
4.3  THE BOTTOM LINE QUESTIONS  
  The bottom line questions are: why are some policies, particularly monopoly 
control and movement restrictions, so popular and keep re-appearing, and what persuades 
governments to continue to provide regulatory supports to food logistic agencies? Policy-
makers and bureaucrats, by nature, are risk-adverse.  Some would argue that the policies 
have worked – although, not necessarily very well. They will change only when a 
conclusive case is made that alternatives work better.  However, both monopoly controls 
over international trade and restrictions on foodgrain movements encourage corruption. 
When parastatals are given monopoly status, it provides corrupt food officials and 
politicians an opportunity to receive large commissions for arranging government-to-
government contract. In the absence of highly sophisticated audit system the corruption 
can go undetected, even when purchase prices are set way above what are warranted by 
the actual quality of grain imported. In addition to the transfer of resources from 
taxpayers to corrupt officials, such incentives create massive waste associated with 
excess and rotting grain in public warehouses (Roumaset 2000 and 2003).    
In the case of movement restrictions, incentives for rent- seeking are even higher, 
especially in countries where public procurement is large and foodgrain production varies 
greatly across regions. In addition to subsidizing food officials, the policy creates 






from surplus regions who collect higher taxes, and even for the politicians and food 
officials from deficit regions who can gain by bringing subsidized grains and selling them 
at higher prices. Benefits to special interests are some of the reasons why, despite 
overwhelming evidence of its inefficiency, the policy keeps re-appearing.
22  
5.  BENEFITS AND COSTS  
 
Admittedly it is difficult to separate the contribution of price stabilization policies 
from the overall government commitment as expressed in all policies and investments. 
Similarly it is difficult to separate the contributions of policies and investments from the 
contributions of the institutions implementing the policies and investments. These 
problems notwithstanding, we will attempt to draw inferences about benefits based on (a) 
price stability and (b) performance of the agricultural sector ; compare the operational 
costs of parastatals in countries that liberalized (or reduced intervention) with countries 
that continue to have significant parastatals’ presence; and finally draw implications for 
reforms.    
5.1   BENEFITS OF PRICE POLICIES 
5.1.1   Price Stabilization 
If the commonly used measure of price stability—that is the coefficient of 
variation—in domestic markets is compared with that in the international markets, all  
                                                 
22 Indian experiences clearly suggest that movement restrictions have hindered private trade, bred 
corruption, and contributed to poor integration of markets It was counter-productive even in the early years 
in India. After the central government gave power to the provinces to control movement, every province, 
every district, every taluk (smallest administrative unit) in eastern India had become a food republic unto 






countries reviewed in this paper appear have done well in case of food prices.
23 This is a 
common finding in existing literature and some studies have attempted to link the price 
stability with other economic and political indicators. For highlighting the impacts of 
price stability, some authors have concluded that “the countries most successful at price 
stabilization have also been among the fastest growing economies in the world” (Timmer 
1992); and that where food prices have not been stabilized successfully and food security 
remains questionable, political stability and economic growth have been threatened 
(Pinkney 1993). Since these studies are based on cross-country empirics, a plausible 
interpretation of the conclusions is that price stability can have positive impacts, 
irrespective of the level at which prices are stabilized.  
In our sample of countries, an aggregate analysis would probably yield the same 
conclusion, that is, all countries have been able to stabilize prices and achieve significant 
agricultural growth over the past few decades. There is no denying that the stability of 
prices—no matter at what level they are stabilized—can mitigate risks and give farmers 
some degree of certainty in allocating their land in favor of the crops for which prices are 
guaranteed. However, analyzing the levels of stability can offer further insights as to 
whether the stability has been achieved efficiently. If the international parity is taken as 
the benchmark, our case studies indicate that the countries have stabilized prices at 
various levels.  For example, compared to world rice prices, the Philippine has 
maintained its domestic prices above, India has almost always kept it below, and  
                                                 
23 Note that Vietnam has not pursued price stabilization in conventional sense. The food logistic agency 
(VINAFOOD) neither procures from the farmers nor distributes to the consumers; its role is restricted 
mainly to rice export within the limit of government-set quota.  In the Philippines, price stabilization 






Indonesia has stabilized around the world prices. The policies for wheat have also been 
different in India and Pakistan, the two main wheat growing countries in our sample. In 
India, wheat prices were supported above international prices until 1989 (since when??), 
below international prices during 1990-1998, and above international prices during 1999-
2002.  By contrast Pakistan has always maintained wheat prices below international 
prices; and to make this stabilization policy effective, the government has heavily taxed 
agriculture over the past three decades.
24 
Does stabilizing at various levels matter in term of growth and public spending? 
A rigorous analysis-based answer to this question is beyond the scope of the study. 
However, available studies from two countries in our sample, Indonesia and Bangladesh, 
suggest that stabilizing around the international parity does have high pay off in the initial 
years. In Indonesia, where domestic prices of rice were maintained around world prices 
until about early-1990s, Timmer (1997) has demonstrated that price stability did 
contribute to the country’s growth rates. In particular, his econometric estimates suggest 
that stabilized rice prices raised the growth rate of Indonesia by about 16 percent during 
1969-74, 14 percent during 1974-79, and 4 percent during 1989-91 over what they would 
have been otherwise. In Bangladesh, where major reforms have been implemented to 
bring domestic prices to international parity, there has been reduction in food subsidy 
bills and, compared to earlier periods, price variability has declined in the 1990s (Ahmed 
et. al. 2000; and del Ninno et. al. 2001).  
                                                 
24 The information on varying policies come from Gulati and Narayanan (2003) for India; Clarete (2003) 
for the Philippines; Schiff and Valdes (1992) and Salam and Mukhter (2003) for Pakistan; and Timmer 






5.1.2   Performance of Agricultural Sector 
In Asian countries, most of which have practiced price stabilization during the 
past thirty years or so, the performance of agricultural sector has been remarkable. 
Compared to pre-Green Revolution years, cereal production has more than doubled (even  
quadrupled in many cases), poverty has declined in both relative and absolute terms, and 
many countries in the region are now enjoying overall economic growth and prosperity 
(Table 8). Rice production has increased from 99 million tons in the 1960s to about 260 
million tons during 2000-03; proportion of undernourished people has declined by about 
40 percent; and per capita income in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) has more than 
tripled. Successes are spectacular when measured by poverty reduction in Indonesia and 
India; and by rice production in Indonesia and wheat production in India and Bangladesh. 
In just two decades, proportions of undernourished people have declined from 26 percent 
to six percent in Indonesia, from 38 percent to 21 percent in India; total wheat production 
has increased from 12.55 million tons in the 1960s to more than 68 million tons in 
2000/01 in India, and from mere 50,000 tons in the 1960s to 1.6 million tons in the 
2000/01 in Bangladesh.  
These are remarkable successes, but price policy was not the only driving force in 
achieving them. Arguably, price policy was a catalyst to the main force of agricultural 
growth, that is, rapid diffusion of new technology. However, although technology was the 
major force behind the success, one has to acknowledge that things would probably have 
been different in the absence of price policies, and complementary investment in 
agriculture. In 1967, with first time large- scale adoption of HYVs, India harvested 17 






tons. The challenge of such a big harvest was bigger than anybody had ever anticipated. 
Neither the farmers nor the government was equipped with infrastructure to deal with 
such a big blessing of technology. Many schools in rural Punjab were closed down to 
store the grain and, while students were on holidays, policy makers confronted hard work 
of dealing with the new situation.  What would have happened in the absence of such a 
policy to ensure the floor price? There is no counter- factual to answer the question, but 
one can certainly imagine that prices would have collapsed, farmers would have lost 
incentives, and technology diffusion would have slowed down, if not stopped altogether.  
5.1.3  Disaster Mitigation 
 
None of the countries in Asia has had a major food security crisis since they 
adopted integrated food and agricultural policies. For example, there has been no famine 
or major food security crisis in India since the great Bengal famine of 1943—although 
there have been several episodes of major droughts and other natural disasters. Similarly, 
despite being hit by several devastating floods, Bangladesh has not had famine or major 
food security crisis since the country adopted integrated food and agricultural polices 
after the 1974 famine. The most striking example is the 1998 flood in Bangladesh, which 







Table 7—Changes in the cereal production, nutritional status, and income 
Period/ 
Indicators  Bangladesh India  Indonesia  Pakistan Philippines Vietnam 
All six 
Countries 
Production Growth Rates 
   Rice
1              
       1951-66  2.0  2.4  2.6  4.3  2.5  4.8  18.6 
       1966-77  2.8  5.1  5.0  7.3  5.3  2.1  27.6 
       1977-88  1.7  2.7  5.4  0.7  1.9  4.4  16.8 
       1988-00  4.1  1.5  1.8  3.4  2.7  5.6  19.1 
   Wheat
2              
       1951-66  3.2  3.2  n.a  2.2  n.a  n.a  8.6 
       1966-77  7.8  7.8  n.a  6.2  n.a  n.a  24.0 
       1977-88  4.3  4.3  n.a  3.3  n.a  n.a  11.9 
       1988-00  3.5  3.5  n.a  3.2  n.a  n.a  10.2 
              
Cereal Production (in million metric tons)
 3 
   Rice (Paddy)            
1960s 15.70  54.00  13.78  2.23  4.26  9.14  99.11 
1970s 17.75  67.63  22.73  4.03  6.17  10.80  129.11 
1980s 22.71  90.76  38.34  4.93  8.51  15.56  180.81 
1990s 28.17  121.03  48.68  6.04  10.29  25.22  239.43 
2000-03 33.16  126.43  50.58  6.69  11.76  30.37  258.99 
   Wheat               
1960s 0.05  12.55  n.a  4.67  1.49  n.a  4.69 
1970s 0.21  27.33  n.a  8.03  2.57  n.a  9.54 
1980s 1.12  44.20  n.a  12.31  3.83  n.a  15.37 
1990s 1.35  62.52  n.a  16.53  4.38  n.a  21.20 
2000-03 1.62  68.39  n.a  18.24  4.37  n.a  23.16 
Proportion of Undernourished population (%)
4 
      1979-81  42  38  26  31  27  33  33 
      1990-92  35  25  9  26  26  27  25 
      1995-97  38  21  6  19  23  21  21 
      1999-01  32  21  6  19  22  19  20 
              
GDP Per Capita, PPP (current international $)
5 
1970s 418  618  580  495  1802  --  783 
1980s 768  1172  1312  1029  2716  940  1323 
1990s 1245  2163  2634  1649  3436  1485  2102 
2001 1610  2840  2940  1890  3840  2070  2532 
              
Notes:    
1 IRRI, calculated and provided by David Dawe. 
2 CIMMYT, 1998/99 World Wheat Facts and Trends, (online), Growth of Wheat Production (%/year). 
3 Calculated from FAOSTAT annual data 
4 FAO, The State of Food Insecurity, 1999 and 2003. 








5.1.4  The Bottom Line 
 
  These success stories, although people might argue to what extent they can be 
attributed to price policies, are in sharp contrast with what many economists had 
predicted in the 1960s. Forty years ago, many development experts were writing off 
Asia.
25  The region was termed a “development basket case”.  Famine 1975 (Paddock and 
Paddock (1967), “lifeboat ethics” (Hardin 1978), and “triage” (Ehrlich 1961) were the 
labels commonly applied to the countries of the region. The progress has been 
remarkable; and we would like to argue that the price policies and the parastatals that 
implemented major components of them do deserve some credit, if not all. .   
5.2  COSTS OF OPERATION 
5.2.1   Countries with Significant Parastatals Presence 
In addition to direct operational costs, food-marketing parastatals impose various 
forms of implicit costs to the society, which include: costs due to policy distortions, costs 
of providing regulatory supports, and costs of special interests and rent-seeking. The 
country case studies suggest that the food-marketing parastatals are becoming 
increasingly expensive; their costs are higher than those of the private sector; the margin 
of costs between parastatals and private sector are widening; and the operations of 
parastatals are increasingly being dictated by special interests.   
This evidence is obvious in all major Asian countries that have significant 
parastatals presence and seem to echo some of the very problems that the opponents of 
                                                 






price stabilization policies had predicted through their theoretical models. In India, 
government’s subsidy bills for buffer stocking have increased from US$160 million in 
1992 to an estimated US$1.6 billion dollars in 2002; in Indonesia, total costs of 
inefficiency in BULOG are estimated at US$2.0 billion over a five year period, starting in 
1993; in the Philippine, average annual losses to the society due to National Food 
Authority’s (NFA) interventions are estimated at more than US$ 414 million dollars 
during 1996- to 1998 time period.  In Pakistan, food subsidy bills fluctuated between US$ 
49 million and US$ 245 million during 1990-2003. To put the size of the subsidies in 
perspective, wheat subsidies in Punjab have exceeded total expenditure by the department 
of agriculture.  
A few studies in India and Pakistan have compared unit cost of operation of the 
parastatals with that of private sectors. The findings are striking. Despite concessional 
credit and transportation, per unit trading cost of wheat by FCI is estimated to be more 
than twice as much as private traders costs (Chand 2002). For rice, FCI’s cost is about 20 
percent higher than the private traders. Not only have the unit costs of FCI operation been 
larger than private traders, some studies suggest that the gap between the two has been 
widening in recent years (Jha and Srinivasan 2003). In Pakistan, return on sales of 
PASSCO was estimated at 2.12 percent, much lower than average return on sales of 10 
percent or more in comparable private firms (Farouqee et al. 1995). For the provincial 
agency, the Punjab Agricultural Development and Supplies Corporation (PAD&SC), the 
estimated return on sales was negative 7.92 percent, suggesting that it was operating at 






procurement is even more alarming. Procurement costs per ton by PASSCO have almost 
doubled in nominal terms since 1996 and the Punjab Food Department has incurred even 
higher costs.
26    
Evidence of special interest groups’ influence on food logistic agencies has also 
surfaced frequently. For instance, many recent reports indicate that the politicians and 
farmers in the surplus states heavily influence the minimum support prices in India (Dev 
et al.2003). The inherent interests are simple: higher support prices mean more secured 
markets for farmers, larger procurement for the parastatals, and higher tax revenues for 
the politicians in the states. Guaranteed markets make farmers happy, especially the 
larger ones, and the happier the farmers the greater are the chances for politicians to get 
re-elected at least in surplus states. A simple comparison of price series and land 
allocation data will better illustrate how support prices have been influenced. Between 
1996/97 and 2000/01, the government’s support prices for wheat and rice in India grew 
by about 25 and 10 percent faster than their respective wholesale prices; and the farmers 
in the surplus states responded to these increases by allocating more land to rice and 
wheat during the same period. For example, although area under rice increased by about 
4 percent at the national level, it increased by 27 percent in Haryana, 21 percent in 
Punjab, and about 15 percent in AP during 1995/96-2000/01. In case of wheat, land 
allocation has increased by about 10 percent at the national level, 26 percent in the state 
of Andhra Pradesh, 17 percent in Haryana, 16 percent in Madhya Pradesh, 50 percent in 
                                                 
26 PASSCO’s procurement costs increased from Rs. 1217.59 per metric ton in 1996/97 to Rs. 2430.96 per 
metric ton in 2002-03; and PFD’s costs increased from Rs. 919.60 to Rs. 2350.00 during the same period 
(Salam and Mukhter 2003). In real terms, the rate of increase has been even higher, as the inflation rates in 






Maharashtra, and five percent each in the states of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.
27 This type 
of policy action clearly defies the very notion of “floor prices” and distorts the incentive 
structure in agriculture, and in fact slows down the natural process of diversification 
away from cereals to high value agriculture.  
Similar stories are also common in other countries. In the Philippines, the NFA 
has used its monopoly power to import food grain, even at times when the country had 
enough stock to meet its food security demand. Special interest groups succeeded in 
reversing liberalization policies, such as re-instituting monopoly control over 
international trade in both Indonesia and Pakistan, and re-instituting movement restriction 
in Pakistan.  
5.2.2  Experiences of Reduced Intervention and Liberalization 
The experiences of trade liberalization, carried out under structural adjustment 
programs, also support the contention that reduced intervention can contribute to 
efficiency gains and market development. Countries in Asia, particularly Bangladesh, 
that have pursued this route have been able to allocate more resources to development 
and anti-poverty projects, increase competition in domestic markets, maintain price 
stability, and enhance overall social welfare. In Bangladesh, the share of public food in 
anti-poverty and development programs has increased from as low as 32 percent during 
pre-reform period (1971/72—1991/92) to as high as 85 percent during post-reform period 
(1992/93 to 2002/03); private sector participation in international trade has resulted in 
                                                 
27 The price figures are from the High Level Committee report of the GOI (2003); and land allocation 






reducing the government’s costs by an estimated US$190 million per year; and more 
importantly, despite distributing larger proportion of food to the poor, annual food 
subsidy bills have declined from US$122 million in the eighties to about US$65.4 million 
in the nineties (Ali and Jahan 2003; Ahmed et al. 2000). In Vietnam, where parastatals 
had absolute control over production and distribution of agricultural products until 1981, 
market liberalization has greatly contributed to increasing production, enhancing 
technology adoption, and improving overall social welfare. Rice production grew at a rate 
of 5.6 percent between 1988 and 1995, transforming Vietnam from being a chronic food 
deficit country to a leading exporter of rice in Asia (Goletti and Minot 1997, and Minot 
and Goletti 1998).  
Not only did liberalization reduce subsidies and saved public resources, it 
contributed to strengthening private markets too. Private marketing has strengthened 
perceptively in both Bangladesh and Vietnam. In Bangladesh, the number of traders has 
risen by ten-fold between the 1970s and 1990s. The number of millers doubled from 
6,155 in the 1960s, to 11,592 in the 1970s, then increased more than fourfold by the 
1990s to nearly 51,000.  The liberalization of rice and wheat imports in the early 1990s, 
the removal of the import tariff on rice, and instructions to expedite clearance of price 
sector foodgrains imports in early 1998 have provided clear signals to the private sector 
of government support for the marketing trade.  As a result, wholesale markets for both 
rice and wheat are spatially integrated, with over 80 percent of price changes transmitted 






In Vietnam, the number of private traders increased at an amazing rate after 
liberalization. Tens of thousands of traders handle millions of tons of rice every year, 
channeling it from surplus farmers to urban consumers, rural rice-deficit areas, and 
exporters.  The channels are numerous and differ from one area to another.  Although 
monopoly status of VINAFOOD and export quota is argued to be mechanisms to ensure 
adequate domestic supply and price stability, the country does not have price stabilization 
in conventional sense. In particular, the SOEs (or other public agencies) neither procure 
any significant amount from the farmers nor do they respond to seasonal and spatial price 
swings (Son et. al. 2003). Having made this observation, Vietnam’s impending entry into 
the World Trade Organization is likely to motivate reexamination of some of its policies, 
specifically the rice export quota.     
5.3    SO WHAT?  
The evidence presented in this section suggests that the costs of public 
agricultural price stabilization—in terms of direct costs and rent- seeking—have been 
high and are increasing.  The price stabilization mechanisms, which were initially cost 
effective, have become cost-ineffective and outlived their usefulness. The reformers have 
demonstrated that there is much to gain—in terms of saving public resources and 
enhancing market development--by reducing public intervention in foodgrain markets.  
It is time to learn from the reformers and recognize the fact that public funds have 
alternative uses. The returns to some alternative investments are high – perhaps much 
higher than the returns to public price stabilization as currently practiced (Roumasset 






most effective in increasing agricultural productivity are agricultural research and 
development, roads, and education; rural public investments that are the most effective in 
decreasing poverty are  roads, agricultural research, education, rural development, soil 
and water conservation, health, and irrigation in India and education, agricultural research 
and development, roads, electricity, telephones, irrigation, and poverty loans in China 
(Fan et al. 2000; Fan et al. 2002).  That is, agricultural research, roads, and education, 
rank among the top three public investments in terms of their returns—no matter whether 
evaluated against increasing agricultural productivity or decreasing poverty. 
There are other areas where public funds can be justifiably used. Two issues are 
of particular importance. First, even if markets can be relied on for efficient allocation of 
resources, given the level of poverty, the need for social safety net will remain, although 
they do not have to be implemented as part of the “procurement-stocking distribution” 
framework. Second, given high level agricultural subsidies by industrial countries, and 
relatively higher variability in world price, complete government withdrawal will not be a 
politically feasible reform option. A compromise might be to enforce a reasonable price 
band that allows arbitrage opportunities and encourages private sector participation in the 
grain market.  However, this will require a shift from the existing paradigm to a new set 
of policies and institutions.  How such a shift can be made is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but is addressed elsewhere.
28  
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6.  SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
  
Drawing from the country case studies, this paper has attempted to synthesize 
diverse experiences of grain market intervention policies in selected Asian countries. The 
main focus has been on: (a) providing a critical overview of the evolution of food and 
price policies and the parastatals agencies entrusted to implement those policies, (b) 
assessing the underlying rationales justifying government interventions in grain markets, 
(c) documenting policy responses to changing conditions, and (d) comparing experiences 
of countries that liberalized (or reduced government intervention) with the ones that 
continue to have significant parastatals’ presence.  
Five major conclusions emerge from the synthesis. First, the four commonly 
agreed rationales—that is, poorly integrated domestic markets, promoting technology, 
thin and volatile world market, and international liquidity constraints—for public 
intervention in foodgrain markets are no longer convincing. Second, although rationales 
have lost their significance, many countries continue to practice old set of policies and 
provide regulatory supports to the parastatals, including monopoly control over 
international trade, preferential access to transportation, restrictions on movement of 
foodgrain, and cheap or interest- free credit.  Third, the costs of price stabilization 
especially as implemented by parastatals have been high and are increasing relative to 
those of the private sector.  Available estimates of food subsidies and the costs of system 
inefficiencies are staggering in all countries that continue to have significant parastatals’ 
presence. Fourth, the food-marketing parastatals are being increasingly dictated by 






Indonesia and Pakistan, government’s foodgrain import decisions in the Philippines, and 
manipulation of ceiling and floor prices in India. Finally, liberalization of foodgrain 
markets appears to have beneficial impacts on the economy. In Vietnam and Bangladesh, 
both of which have implemented extensive reforms over the last fifteen years, food 
subsidies have declined, private markets have strengthened perceptively, number of 
private traders has increased many folds, and more public resources are now available for 
alternative public investments, notably in poverty alleviation programs.  
 In summation, we conclude that times have changed: policies and public agencies 
that may have been appropriate thirty years ago are not optimal today. Private institutions 
have strengthened significantly and should now be entrusted for many of the functions 
that parastatals, or other government agencies, have traditionally performed. This will 
release public funds for alternative investments that have higher returns—most likely 
higher than the returns to public price stabilization as currently practiced. Recent studies 
have demonstrated that returns to public investments—such as agricultural research, 
roads, and education—ranks very high, in terms of increased agricultural productivity or 
decreased poverty. The early reformers have demonstrated that reduction of government 
control can promote competition in the domestic markets, reduce subsidies, and release 
funds for development and anti-poverty programs—all without jeopardizing price 
stability or food security. Thus, changing the old ways of attaining food security and 
price stability is perhaps overdue; and holding on to the old practices can only mean 
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